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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the universe of civil procedure, two principles are well 
established.  First, “an amended complaint supercedes [sic] an 
original complaint and renders the original complaint without 
legal effect.”1  Second, “an error not raised and preserved at the 
trial court level will not be considered on appeal.”2  These two 
maxims collide in the context of preserving claims for appellate 
review when they are dismissed with leave to amend. 
To illustrate the issue, imagine that a plaintiff files a four-count 
complaint in a federal district court.  On a 12(b)(6) motion,3 the 
judge dismisses the plaintiff’s two best claims with leave to amend.4  
 
 1. Karnes v. Poplar Bluff Transfer Co. (In re Atlas Van Lines, Inc.), 209 F.3d 
1064, 1067 (8th Cir. 2000); see also 6 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1476, at 90 (3d ed. 2010) (“Once an amended 
pleading is interposed, the original pleading no longer performs any function in 
the case and any subsequent motion made by an opposing party should be 
directed at the amended pleading.” (footnote omitted)). 
 2. Ryan Walters, Raise It or Waive It? Addressing the Federal and State Split in 
Authority on Whether a Conviction Under an Unconstitutional Statute Is a Jurisdictional 
Defect, 62 BAYLOR L. REV. 909, 916–17 (2010); see also Yakus v. United States, 321 
U.S. 414, 444 (1944) (“No procedural principle is more familiar to this Court than 
that a constitutional right may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the 
failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to 
determine it.”). 
 3. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (allowing a party to assert the defense that the 
complaint “fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted”). 
 4. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2) (“The court should freely give leave [to 
amend] when justice so requires.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 
2000) (“[U]nder Rule 12(b)(6), ‘a district court should grant leave to amend even 
if no request to amend the pleading was made . . . .’” (quoting Doe v. United 
2
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At this point, the plaintiff’s options for the dismissed claims are 
limited without a final judgment5—neither an interlocutory appeal 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)6 nor an appeal from a judgment 
certified as final under Rule 54(b)7 is available.8  Perhaps if the 
plaintiff strongly believes in the merits of the original dismissed 
claims, the plaintiff will disclaim the opportunity to amend and 
insist on an expedited appellate review.9  However, if the plaintiff 
decides to amend the complaint,10 the issue of this article is 
presented: must the plaintiff replead the dismissed claims in order 
to preserve the dismissal error for appellate review? 
This issue is complicated when viewed in light of the two 
maxims of complaint supersession and issue preservation.  On one 
hand, the amended complaint superseded the original complaint, 
and, thus, dismissed claims not repleaded in the amended 
complaint remain with the legally ineffective original complaint.  
 
States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995))). 
 5. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006) (“The courts of appeals . . . shall have 
jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts . . . .”); Catlin v. 
United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945) (“A ‘final decision’ generally is one which 
ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but 
execute the judgment.” (citing St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v. S. Express Co. (Express 
Companies’ Cases), 108 U.S. 24, 28 (1883))); Moya v. Schollenbarger, 465 F.3d 444, 
451 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[W]hen the dismissal order expressly grants the plaintiff 
leave to amend, that conclusively shows that the district court intended only to 
dismiss the complaint; the dismissal is thus not a final decision.”); 15A CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 3914.1, at 494–95 
(2d ed. 1992) (“An order that both dismisses and grants leave to amend . . . is not 
final until some further event makes it final.” (footnote omitted)). 
 6. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006) (requiring that an interlocutory appeal be 
granted where there is “a controlling question of law as to which there is 
substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from 
the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation”). 
 7. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) provides that “when multiple 
parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or 
more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines 
that there is no just reason for delay.” 
 8. Certification under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) or Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(b) requires trial court consent, which would naturally be difficult to 
obtain when the court has expressly provided leave to amend on its own initiative. 
 9. 15A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 5, § 3914.1, at 496 (“Finality thus may be 
achieved following dismissal with leave to amend by formally disclaiming the 
opportunity to amend, and some opinions seem to require a disclaimer. . . . 
[Moreover, c]ourts often have been willing to treat an appeal as an election to 
stand on the original complaint, making the judgment final.”). 
 10. 15A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 5, § 3914.1, at 507 (“The choice to pursue 
an amended complaint before appeal often may avoid the need for any appeal, or 
reduce the prospect of multiple appeals.”). 
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On the other hand, the dismissal was an issue argued by both 
parties and ruled on by the trial court, and thus, the error was 
preserved for appellate review even without the plaintiff repleading 
the issue in the amended complaint. 
When confronted with this situation,11 eight of the federal 
courts of appeals have taken various approaches to determine 
whether a plaintiff has waived the dismissed claims for appellate 
review.12  The Seventh Circuit has adopted a blanket approach that 
does not require any repleading to preserve dismissed claims for 
appellate review.13  The Second, Third, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh 
Circuits have taken a flexible approach that requires repleading to 
preserve claims dismissed for technical deficiencies, but not for 
claims dismissed for legal deficiencies.14  At the opposite end of the 
spectrum, the Ninth Circuit has adopted a blanket approach that 
requires repleading to preserve all claims regardless of the type of 
deficiency.15  And although the Eighth Circuit was the first court to 
articulate the flexible approach,16 recent case law suggests that this 
court now favors the Ninth Circuit blanket approach.17 
In light of the federal courts of appeals’ disagreement on this 
topic and the lack of a U.S. Supreme Court ruling, this article 
analyzes the issue and recommends an approach that best fulfills 
the purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.18  The 
discussion begins in Part II with a background on the maxims of 
original complaint supersession and issue preservation.  Part III 
 
 11. This article only addresses the specific situation of when a plaintiff’s 
claims are dismissed with leave to amend.  Various courts have ruled that 
repleading is not required in other circumstances.  See, e.g., Young v. City of Mount 
Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 572–73 (4th Cir. 2001) (claims dismissed without leave to 
amend); USS-POSCO Indus. v. Contra Costa Cnty. Bldg. & Constr. Trades 
Council, 31 F.3d 800, 812 (9th Cir. 1994) (claims disposed of by way of summary 
judgment). 
 12. Other circuit courts are either silent or reluctant to rule on the issue.  
E.g., Young, 238 F.3d at 573 n.4 (“We do not consider whether claims dismissed 
with leave to amend must be re-alleged in an amended complaint in order to 
preserve the right to appeal the dismissal, as that issue is not before us.”). 
 13. See infra Part III.A. 
 14. See infra Part III.B. 
 15. See infra Part III.C. 
 16. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 17. See infra Part III.C.2. 
 18. Although this article only examines federal case law, there is indication 
that state courts are split on the issue as well.  See Gavin v. AT&T Corp., No. 01 C 
2721, 2003 WL 22849128, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 1, 2003) (discussing how repleading 
is required under Illinois state law, but is not required under Seventh Circuit 
federal law). 
4
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summarizes the key cases that promulgated the different 
approaches and explains the policy considerations underlying each 
approach.  Part IV argues that the Seventh Circuit’s blanket 
approach best supports the federal rules’ policy considerations.  
Then finally, Part V concludes the article by offering 
recommendations for preserving dismissed claims specifically in 
the Eighth Circuit in light of this circuit’s conflicting case law. 
II. BACKGROUND ON ORIGINAL COMPLAINT SUPERSESSION AND 
ISSUE PRESERVATION 
A. Effects of an Amended Complaint 
Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure controls 
amendments to complaints.19  And it reinforces a basic policy of the 
federal rules: “pleadings are not an end in themselves but are only 
a means to assist in the presentation of a case to enable it to be 
decided on the merits.”20  Accordingly, a court may, on its own 
initiative, require parties to amend a complaint to avoid dismissal, 
and 15(a)(2) dictates that courts should ‘“freely give”’ leave to 
amend ‘“when justice so requires.”’21 
Once the plaintiff amends the complaint under Rule 15, the 
amended complaint “supersedes the pleading it modifies and 
remains in effect throughout the action unless it subsequently is 
modified.”22  Accordingly, the original complaint “cannot be 
utilized to cure defects in the amended pleading, unless the 
relevant portion is specifically incorporated in the new pleading.”23  
But exceptions to the general rule of supersession do exist.  For 
example, the original complaint continues to be relevant for the 
relation back doctrine under Rule 15(c).24  Another example is 
when courts examine the issue of removal jurisdiction based on the 
original complaint.25 
The policy underlying the supersession rule is simple: “to 
ensure that the pleadings give notice of all the issues that are in 
 
 19. FED. R. CIV. P. 15. 
 20. 6 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1, § 1473, at 601–02. 
 21. Id. § 1473, at 602 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2)). 
 22. Id. § 1476, at 636. 
 23. Id. § 1476, at 640 (footnote omitted). 
 24. Id. 
 25. E.g., O’Halloran v. Univ. of Wash., 856 F.2d 1375, 1379 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(“Jurisdiction is based on the complaint as originally filed and not as amended.”). 
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controversy so [that] they can be handled and comprehended 
expeditiously.”26 
B. Preserving and Waiving Issues for Appellate Review 
Waiver is commonly understood as the “voluntary and 
intentional relinquishment of a known right.”27  Thus, a failure to 
raise an issue voluntarily at the trial court results in a waiver of that 
issue for appellate review.28  Indeed, even a constitutional right may 
be forfeited by a failure to timely raise an issue.29 
The rationales for the raise-or-waive rule include: encouraging 
finality, promoting judicial economy, preventing unfair surprise, 
preserving a system of allowing litigants to frame and present the 
issues, and discouraging abuse of the appellate system.30 
III. FEDERAL APPROACHES FOR DETERMINING THE PRESERVATION OF 
DISMISSED CLAIMS 
Eight of the federal courts of appeals have produced three 
different approaches in determining whether a plaintiff is required 
to replead claims that were dismissed with leave to amend in order 
to preserve them for appellate review.  At the most plaintiff-friendly 
end of the spectrum, the “no repleading” approach requires no 
repleading at all for dismissed claims to be reviewable.31  But at the 
most defendant-friendly end of the spectrum, the “replead all” 
approach requires everything to be repleaded in order to preserve 
the claims for appeal.32  Intermediately, some courts have adopted 
a flexible, “deficiency” approach which examines the nature of the 
defect in the original complaint in order to determine the 
preservation issue.33 
 
 26. 6 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1, § 1476, at 641. 
 27. Haddock v. Nationwide Fin. Servs., 514 F. Supp. 2d 267, 272 (D. Conn. 
2007). 
 28. Walters, supra note 2, at 916–17. 
 29. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S 414, 444 (1944). 
 30. Walters, supra note 2, at 916–17. 
 31. See infra Part III.A. 
 32. See infra Part III.C. 
 33. See infra Part III.B. 
6
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A. The “No Repleading” Approach 
1. The Seventh Circuit Origin 
In Bastian v. Petren Resources Corp., the Seventh Circuit 
established the “no repleading” approach.34  The plaintiffs in 
Bastian invested $600,000 in oil and gas limited partnerships 
promoted by the defendants.35  The plaintiffs brought a complaint 
alleging violations of Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act36 
and the RICO statute,37 asserting that they would not have invested 
in these partnerships but for the defendants’ misrepresentations 
and misleading omissions.38 
On a 12(b)(6) motion, the district court dismissed the 
complaint with leave to amend39 because of pleading deficiencies 
including the failure to allege “loss causation”40 for the Rule 10b-5 
charge.41  The plaintiffs then amended the complaint, but they did 
not replead the Rule 10b-5 claim because they did not think that 
loss causation was an element that was necessary and provable at 
the time.42  The court ultimately dismissed the amended complaint 
as well,43 but with prejudice this time.44 
On appeal, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs had 
 
 34. 892 F.2d 680, 682–83 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 35. Id. at 682. 
 36. See generally 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011) (prohibiting any act or omission 
resulting in fraud or deceit in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security). 
 37. See generally Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1961–68 (2006) (providing for extended criminal penalties and a civil 
cause of action for acts performed as part of an ongoing criminal organization). 
 38. Bastian, 892 F.2d at 682. 
 39. Id.  Neither the district court nor circuit court opinions specifically stated 
that the complaint was dismissed with leave to amend, only that it was dismissed 
with prejudice; however, this is obvious because the circuit court analyzed the issue 
in the context of a dismissal with leave to amend.  See id.  (“[T]hat dismissal was . . . 
of a complaint with leave to amend . . . .” (citing Harris v. Milwaukee Cnty. Circuit 
Court, 886 F.2d 982, 984 (7th Cir. 1989); 28 U.S.C. § 1291)); Bastian v. Petren Res. 
Corp., 681 F. Supp. 530, 538 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (“Count II[, the RICO claim,] is 
dismissed with prejudice.”). 
 40. Bastian, 892 F.2d at 682.  “[L]oss causation” is a showing that “if the facts 
had been as represented by the defendants[, then] the value of the limited 
partnerships would not have declined.”  Id. 
 41. Id.  The RICO charge had a minor technical deficiency that was curable.  
Id. 
 42. Id. at 682–83. 
 43. The RICO charge was also dismissed on the ground that a RICO case 
requires “loss causation.”  Id. at 682. 
 44. Id. 
7
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waived their right to challenge the dismissal of the Rule 10b-5 claim 
because they did not replead that claim in the amended 
complaint.45  Writing for the majority, Judge Posner rejected the 
defendants’ argument based on the principle that “[w]hen a final 
decision is appealed, the appeal brings up all previous rulings of 
the district judge adverse to the appellant.”46  The crux of Judge 
Posner’s argument against waiver is that “[o]therwise there would 
be no way to obtain appellate review of those rulings . . . .”47  
Indeed, Judge Posner emphasized: “It is not waiver—it is prudence 
and economy—for parties not to reassert a position that the trial 
judge has rejected.”48 
The Bastian court also equated this situation to when a district 
judge grants partial summary judgment to a defendant.49  In that 
scenario, the plaintiff would definitely be able to challenge the 
granting of the partial summary judgment.50  In sum, Judge Posner 
saw no reason to differentiate the procedural process of a dismissal 
with leave to amend and that of a granting of partial summary 
judgment.51 
2. Summarizing the “No Repleading” Approach 
In making all rulings available for appellate review regardless 
of whether the dismissed claims were repleaded, the “no 
repleading” approach is primarily concerned with the underlying 
policy of issue preservation—that raised issues should be available 
for appellate review.  This approach views the plaintiff's original 
assertion of the issue and the plaintiff's opposition to the 
defendant's motion to dismiss as satisfying the raise-or-waive rule.  
In addition, this approach recognizes that when a trial judge 
requests an amendment by providing a leave to amend along with 
the dismissal, the plaintiff can safely assume that judge does not 
want the plaintiff to reassert a rejected position. 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id.  (citing Asset Allocation & Mgmt. Co. v. W. Emp’rs Ins. Co., 892 F.2d 
566, 569 (7th Cir. 1989) (upholding jurisdiction over an appeal of an injunction)) 
(emphasis added). 
 47. Id. at 682–83. 
 48. Id. at 683. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
8
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B. The “Deficiency” Approach 
While the Seventh Circuit adopts a blanket “no repleading” 
approach that renders all rulings reviewable on appeal, six other 
circuit courts follow a flexible approach that is still plaintiff-
friendly, but renders some rulings unreviewable depending on the 
deficiency of the original complaint.  The rulings of the Third, 
Eighth, and Tenth circuit courts were especially important in 
advancing the theory of this approach. 
1. The Eighth Circuit Origin 
Over a century ago, the Eighth Circuit adopted the 
“deficiency” approach in Williamson v. Liverpool & London & Globe 
Insurance Co.52  The plaintiff in Williamson sued an insurance 
company under its fire insurance policies to recover damages.53  
Relying on a Missouri statute,54 the plaintiff also claimed attorney’s 
fees and additional damages for vexatious delay in payment.55 
At the trial court level, the judge dismissed the complaint with 
leave to amend within three days.56  The complaint was dismissed 
on the ground that the Missouri statute was in contravention of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.57  The 
plaintiff then submitted an amended complaint that entirely 
omitted the claims for additional damages and attorney’s fees.58 
On appeal,59 the Eighth Circuit held that the plaintiff had not 
 
 52. Williamson v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., 141 F. 54, 56–57 
(8th Cir. 1905). 
 53. Id. at 55. 
 54. Williamson v. Liverpool, L. & G. Ins. Co., 105 F. 31, 32 (W.D. Mo. 1900) 
(“The statute in question is found in section 8012, Rev. St. Mo. 1899, as follows: ‘In 
any action against any insurance company to recover the amount of any loss under 
a policy of fire, life, marine or other insurance, if it appear from the evidence that 
such company has vexatiously refused to pay such loss, the court or jury may, in 
addition to the amount thereof and interest, allow the plaintiff damages not 
exceeding ten per cent. on the amount of the loss, and a reasonable attorney’s fee; 
and the court shall enter judgment for the aggregate sum found in the verdict.’”).  
 55. Williamson, 141 F. at 55. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. (“[T]he Missouri statute . . . being directed against insurance 
companies alone, it deprived them of the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 58. Id.  After the amended complaint, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on the 
issue in several separate cases.  Id. at 55–56.  The Williamson plaintiff asked for, but 
was denied, leave to amend her complaint a second time.  Id. at 55. 
 59. The Eight Circuit first held that “the trial court erred in its first ruling, 
and that, . . . the plaintiff possessed a valid cause of action for damages and 
attorney’s fees in addition to the amount of the [fire insurance] policies.”  Id. at 
9
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waived her right to challenge the dismissal of claims for additional 
damages and attorney’s fees.60  The court held that there was no 
waiver when the dismissal “struck a vital blow to a substantial part of 
[the] plaintiff’s cause of action.”61  The court provided, however, 
that waiver would exist if the dismissal was for “indefiniteness, 
incompleteness, . . . insufficiency of statement . . . [or] technical 
defects.”62 
In establishing this rule, the court focused its ruling on 
avoiding a “denial of [the plaintiff’s] substantial right.”63  To that 
end, the court drew a line between claims that were dismissed for 
technical deficiencies and those dismissed for legal deficiencies, 
and only claims of the former are waived if not repleaded in the 
amended complaint. 
2. Following Tenth Circuit Dictum 
Over fifty years after Williamson, the Tenth Circuit, in Blazer v. 
Black, approved of the “deficiency” approach in dictum.64  In turn, 
the Blazer dictum65 became the basis of the majority holding in the 
Tenth Circuit decision of Davis v. TXO Production Corp.66 
a. Blazer v. Black—Tenth Circuit Dictum 
In Blazer, the plaintiff, a former stockholder of a dissolved 
corporation, sued in the District Court of Kansas for compensatory 
and punitive damages against the corporation’s former president.67  
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant, through a series of 
schemes and transactions, fraudulently converted the plaintiff’s 
stock before dissolution.68 
 
57. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id.  The court offered that “[i]t is well settled in federal practice” that this 
is the ruling; however, the court cited no authorities for this proposition.  Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. 196 F.2d 139, 143–44 (10th Cir. 1952). 
 65. See Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. 
REV. 953, 953 (2005) (“A holding consists of those propositions along the chosen 
decisional path or paths of reasoning that are actually decided, are based upon the 
facts of the case, and lead to the judgment. A proposition in a case that is not [a] 
holding is dicta.”) (emphasis added).  
 66. 929 F.2d 1515, 1517–18 (10th Cir. 1991). 
 67. Blazer, 196 F.2d at 141. 
 68. Id.  Allegedly, the defendant “devised a fraudulent scheme to acquire 
control of the . . . [plaintiff’s stock], . . . with the use of corporate funds; enter into 
10
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On the defendant’s motion, the district court dismissed from 
the complaint all allegations related to matters and events 
subsequent to the plaintiff’s departure of its stocks and receipt of 
payment for those stocks.69  With leave to amend, the plaintiff filed 
an amended complaint that included all the same claims for 
fraudulent conduct except for the previously dismissed 
allegations.70  Ultimately, the case went up for appeal after the 
court sustained a motion for a directed verdict in favor of the 
defendant.71 
On appeal, the plaintiff sought to challenge the dismissal of 
certain allegations, but the defendant argued at bar that the 
plaintiff had waived its right to challenge the dismissal by 
amending the complaint and omitting the dismissed claim.72  
Although the Tenth Circuit admitted that it “need not decide 
whether the trial court erroneously sustained the motion to strike 
or whether appellant waived his right to question such ruling by 
pleading over,”73 the court voiced support for the Williamson 
“deficiency” approach by reiterating that  
while the pleader who amends or pleads over, waives his 
objections to the ruling of the court on indefiniteness, 
incompleteness or insufficiency, or mere technical defects 
in pleadings, he does not waive his exception to the ruling 
which strikes “a vital blow to a substantial part” of his 
cause of action.74 
 
an extensive drilling program, with borrowed funds, for the purpose of enhancing 
the value of the stock, and then sell the outstanding stock of the Company to the 
National Cooperative Refinery Association.”  Id.  
 69. Id. at 142–43 (“The court observed that while such allegations might be 
entirely proper in an action for rescission or in a proceedings to impress a trust 
upon funds in the hands of an unfaithful fiduciary, they had no place in a suit for 
money damages for fraud and deceit . . . .”).   
 70. Id. at 143. 
 71. Id. at 141. 
 72. Id. at 143. 
 73. Id. at 144.  The Tenth Circuit concluded that it was unnecessary to decide 
the waiver issue because it was “certain that the second amended complaint . . . 
sufficiently stated a claim based upon a fraudulent scheme under color of a 
fiducial relationship.”  Id. 
 74. Id. at 143–44 (quoting Williamson v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. 
Co., 141 F. 54, 57 (8th Cir. 1905)).  The court noted other state (e.g., Kansas, 
Texas, Ohio) and federal (e.g., Ninth Circuit) jurisdictions that did not follow 
Williamson and stated that Williamson “has long been the rule of Federal practice. . 
. .”  Id. at 143. 
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b. Davis v. TXO Production Corp.—Tenth Circuit Holding 
The Williamson “vital blow” language resurfaced again in the 
Tenth Circuit in the case of Davis v. TXO Production Corp.75  In 
Davis, the plaintiff alleged tortious interference with a business 
relation,76 champerty and maintenance,77 and breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.78  Upon a 12(b)(6) 
dismissal, the plaintiff amended the complaint but did not replead 
the breach of an implied covenant of good faith claim.79 
 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit rejected the defendant’s 
argument that the plaintiff had waived the breach of an implied 
covenant of good faith claim based on a failure to replead that 
claim.80  The court cited the Blazer dictum as presenting “a 
reasonable standard to determine when a party should be allowed 
to assert the trial court’s original alleged error on appeal.”81 
The court further reasoned that a rule that requires plaintiffs 
to replead dismissed claims “merely sets a trap for unsuspecting 
plaintiffs” because the party may be “reticent to raise a claim . . . 
that had been previously dismissed for . . . fear [of the] imposition 
of a Rule 11 sanction.”82 
 
 75. 929 F.2d 1515, 1517–18 (10th Cir. 1991). 
 76. Davis, 929 F.2d at 1516.  See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
766 (1979) (“One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the 
performance of a contract (except a contract to marry) between another and a 
third person by inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to perform the 
contract, is subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the 
other from the failure of the third person to perform the contract.”). 
 77. Davis, 929 F.2d at 1516.  See generally 7 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON 
CONTRACTS § 15:1 (4th ed. 1990) (“Maintenance consists in maintaining, 
supporting or promoting the litigation of another, with most courts requiring that 
the maintaining party act as an officious intermeddler and be without any interest 
in the litigation.  Champerty is a bargain to divide the proceeds of litigation 
between the owner of the litigated claim and the party supporting or enforcing 
the litigation.”).  
 78. Davis, 929 F.2d at 1516.  See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981) (defining “good faith” in the case of a merchant as 
“‘honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair 
dealing in the trade’” (citing U.C.C. §2-103(1)(j))). 
 79. Davis, 929 F.2d at 1516–17.   
 80. Id. at 1518.  The defendant had cited, as support, other previous Tenth 
Circuit decisions in Leggett v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 178 F.2d 436 (10th Cir. 
1949) and Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 69 F.2d 901 (10th Cir. 1934).  Id. at 1517. 
 81. Id.  The Tenth Circuit in effect overruled itself by ruling along the Blazer 
dictum and thus circulated the opinion to the en banc court pursuant to local 
rules.  Id. at 1518 n.3. 
 82. Id. at 1518, 1518 n.2. 
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3. Applying the “Deficiency” Approach to an Amended Complaint 
that Omits a Defendant—Third Circuit 
Sixteen years after the Tenth Circuit accepted the “deficiency” 
approach in Davis, the Third Circuit applied the “deficiency” 
approach to analyze an amended complaint that omitted a 
defendant rather than merely a cause of action. 
In United States ex rel. Atkinson v. Pennsylvania Shipbuilding Co.,83 
the plaintiff brought a qui tam action84 under the False Claims Act 
(FCA),85 alleging that the defendants defrauded the U.S. Navy in 
connection with a contract to build oil tankers.86  Three defendants 
were named in the complaint in question87: Sun Ship Inc. (Sun 
Ship), Pennsylvania Shipbuilding Co. (Penn Ship), and First 
Fidelity Bank, N.A. (Fidelity).88  After a dismissal with leave to 
amend,89 the plaintiff brought a final complaint that named only 
Penn Ship and Fidelity as defendants.90 
On appeal,91 Sun Ship contended that the plaintiff had waived 
his right to appeal the district court’s dismissal by failing to replead 
claims against Sun Ship in the final complaint.92  The Third Circuit 
then adopted the “deficiency” approach by articulating that 
repleading is not required when the dismissals were “with prejudice 
or based on some legal barrier other than want of specificity or 
 
 83. 473 F.3d 506, 515–18 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 84. See Gretchen L. Forney, Note, Qui Tam Suits: Defining the Rights and Roles of 
the Government and the Relator Under the False Claims Act, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1357, 1357 
n.4 (1998) (“The phrase ‘qui tam’ is short for ‘qui tam pro domino rege quam pro 
se ipso in hac parte sequitur,’ which is a Latin phrase interpreted as ‘who brings 
the action for the king as well as for himself.’”). 
 85. See generally Federal False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33 (1994); 
Forney, supra note 84, at 1357 (“[T]he False Claims Act . . . allows private citizens 
to bring suit against those who knowingly defraud the U.S. government.”). 
 86. Atkinson, 473 F.3d at 509. 
 87. The complaint in the case on appeal was the second amended complaint; 
the original complaint was brought by Atkinson and then co-relator Eugene 
Schorsch and was dismissed without prejudice.  Id. at 512. 
 88. Id. at 509, 512. 
 89. The second amended complaint was dismissed under Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure (12)(b)(6) and 9(b).  Id. at 512. 
 90. Id.  The court noted that it appeared to be a strategic choice by 
Atkinson’s counsel that Sun Ship was omitted in the final complaint.  Id. at 516 
n.14.  Atkinson “strongly protested” the omission, but ultimately agreed to it, 
“believing that [counsel] would rename Sun Ship after discovery produced more 
evidence implicating [Sun Ship] in the alleged FCA violations.”  Id. 
 91. The district court ultimately dismissed the action by way of summary 
judgment.  Id. at 514. 
 92. Id. at 515. 
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particularity.”93  The court reasoned that in such a case, the 
dismissals were “on the merits” and thus repleading “would have 
been futile.”94 
Applying this logic, the Third Circuit ruled that the plaintiff 
had indeed waived its right to challenge the Sun Ship dismissal.95  
The court reasoned that “it would not have been futile to replead 
the claims against Sun Ship because the dismissals were based on 
pleading deficiencies rather than substantive disagreements 
regarding the legal requirements of the causes of action.”96  The 
court pointed out that the trial court had in fact “specifically 
invited” the plaintiff to provide a “better factual account of the 
alleged claim.”97 
The Third Circuit also reasoned that the “deficiency” 
approach “appl[ies] even more strongly” when a whole defendant 
is dismissed, because the defendant has “a legitimate expectation 
that [it is] no longer involved in the litigation.”98  It was “unjust 
under these circumstances[,]” in the court’s mind, to allow the 
plaintiff to “drag Sun Ship back into this case” after four years.99 
4. Other Circuit Courts Accepting the “Deficiency” Approach—
Second, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits 
In addition to the Third, Eighth, and Tenth Circuit Courts, 
other courts of appeals have also accepted the “deficiency” 
approach. 
In In re Crysen/Montenay Energy Co.,100 the Second Circuit 
accepted the “futility exception” reasoning of the “deficiency” 
approach and concluded that there was “no reason to require 
repleading of a claim or defense that explicitly has been denied.”101 
In Wilson v. First Houston Investment Corp.,102 the Fifth Circuit, 
 
 93. Id. at 516. 
 94. Id.  
 95. Id. at 518. 
 96. Id. at 517. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 516. 
 99. Id. at 518. 
 100. In re Crysen/Montenay Energy Co., 226 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 101. Id. at 162.  The plaintiff in In re Crysen brought a non-core adversary 
proceeding in federal bankruptcy court against an oil company for alleged breach 
of oil purchase contracts.  Id. at 161.  The plaintiff asserted on appeal that the 
defendant had waived the defense of arbitrability by failing to replead it in any of 
the amended answers.  Id. at 162. 
 102. Wilson v. First Hous. Inv. Corp., 566 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1978), vacated on 
14
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citing dictum from Blazer v. Black, reasoned that a rule which results 
in a waiver for failure to replead is “too mechanical and seems to be 
a rigid application of the [amendment] concept.”103  The court 
further reasoned that it was “not logical” to “completely deny[]” 
the plaintiff’s right to appeal when the plaintiff would have 
retained the right to challenge a ruling on a motion to strike a 
defense as legally insufficient.104 
Lastly, the Eleventh Circuit accepted the “deficiency” 
approach in Dunn v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n.105  The court reasoned 
that the plaintiffs “presumably had nothing to add to their 
[original] claim; consequently, repleading would have been futile 
and would have resulted only in a second dismissal.”106 
5. Summarizing the “Deficiency” Approach  
In contrast to the “no repleading” approach taken by the 
Seventh Circuit in Bastian,107 the “deficiency” approach does not 
allow all dismissed claims to go up on appeal without repleading.  
Instead, only claims dismissed for legal deficiencies are reviewable 
on appeal without repleading, and challenges to dismissals for 
technical pleading deficiencies are waived if not repleaded.  By 
 
other grounds, 444 U.S. 959 (1979).  The plaintiff in Wilson asserted an implied right 
of action for damages under both the Invested Advisors Act and Securities 
Exchange Act.  Id. at 1237.  Upon the district court’s dismissal with leave to 
amend, the plaintiff amended the complaint but excluded the claim based on the 
Investment Advisors Act.  Id. 
 103. Id. at 1238 (quoting 6 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1476, at 393 (1971)). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Dunn v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 193 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 1999).  The 
plaintiffs in Dunn were pilots that sued the pilot’s union for libel.  Id. at 1190.  The 
airline had “encouraged pilots to cross picket lines by promising that any pilot who 
returned to work would receive promotions to higher-paying positions.”  Id. at 
1189.  In response, the pilot’s union placed the plaintiffs on a “scabs” list, which is 
a “list of pilots who crossed union picket lines to fly for [the airline].”  Id. at 1190.  
Moreover, the labor union produced and distributed 50,000 copies of the “scabs” 
list to anyone who wanted a copy.  Id.  The word “scab” in the labor context is “a 
pejorative term that frequently carries with it the threat of harm.”  Id. at 1201 
(Tjoflat, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Jose Lambiet & Craig Barnes, UPS Strike Violence 
Hits Close To Home, SUNSENTINEL.COM (Aug. 10, 1997), http://articles.sun-
sentinel.com/1997-08-10/news/9708100009_1_ups-strike-picket-lines-rod-carter 
(discussing a UPS driver that crossed the picket line and was subsequently pulled 
from his delivery truck by six men, beaten, and stabbed five times with an ice 
pick). 
 106. Dunn, 193 F.3d at 1191 n.5. 
 107. See supra Part III.A. 
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insisting on this dividing line, this approach seeks to balance the 
policy of original complaint supersession against the policy of issue 
preservation. 
This approach supports the policy of original complaint 
supersession by requiring the plaintiff to take an affirmative action 
to give notice of all the issues and parties still in controversy.  This 
requirement of affirmative action makes sense when considering 
the difficulty in ascertaining the intent of the plaintiff’s inaction.  
When dismissed claims are technically deficient, the plaintiff might: 
cure the technical defect; replead the claim; or do nothing further 
with the dismissed claim by omitting it from the amended 
complaint.  The plaintiff’s intent is clear when the defect is cured 
or repleaded; both actions signal how the plaintiff desires to 
advance the argument for the dismissed claim.  But when the claim 
is omitted from the amended complaint, the plaintiff’s intent is 
unclear.  And because of this uncertainty, the “deficiency” 
approach places the burden on the plaintiff to replead in order to 
give notice of all the issues and all the parties that are still in 
controversy. 
On the other hand, when the dismissed claims are legally 
deficient, the “deficiency” approach finds the reasoning for 
requiring an affirmative action less compelling, because in this 
scenario, the legal defect is not curable.  Unlike a technical defect, 
the plaintiff cannot provide a better factual account to cure a legal 
defect.  Accordingly, the defendant is not in danger of having to 
guess whether the plaintiff is simply abandoning the claim by 
choosing not to cure the defect.  Indeed, when the plaintiff cannot 
cure the defect, the “deficiency” approach views the plaintiff’s 
inaction as a sign that the plaintiff stands by the original complaint, 
because that is the only effective step that the plaintiff can take.  
And in this scenario, the plaintiff’s original assertion of the issue 
and the plaintiff’s opposition to the defendant’s motion to dismiss 
satisfy the raise-or-waive rule. 
In short, when the defect is technical in nature, the court 
expects an action from the plaintiff, thus the plaintiff’s inaction 
signals waiver.  But when the defect is legal in nature, the court 
does not expect an action from the plaintiff, thus the plaintiff’s 
inaction does not signal waiver. 
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C. The “Replead All” Approach 
In contrast to all the other approaches that do not require 
repleading to preserve at least some type of claims, the “replead all” 
approach takes the least plaintiff-friendly stance by requiring that 
all types of claims be repleaded in order to preserve them for 
appellate review.  The Ninth Circuit first articulated this approach.  
And the Eighth Circuit, which was the catalyst for the “deficiency” 
approach,108 appears to be leaning toward the “replead all” 
approach as well based on recent case law. 
1. The Ninth Circuit Origin 
The Ninth Circuit first articulated the “replead all” approach 
in Studio Carpenters Local Union No. 946 v. Loew’s, Inc.109  In Studio 
Carpenters, the plaintiff brought a claim seeking a declaratory 
judgment.110  On motion, the trial court dismissed the claim with 
leave to amend.111  The plaintiff then amended the complaint but 
sought damages instead of a declaratory judgment.112  On appeal, 
the Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s assertion that the trial 
court erred in dismissing the original complaint.113  The court’s 
reasoning was short and simple: if the plaintiff thought the 
dismissal was an error, then the plaintiff “should have refused to 
plead further.”114 
After Studio Carpenters, the court continued to uphold the 
“replead all” approach as the law in this circuit in cases such as 
London v. Coopers & Lybrand in 1981,115 King v. Atiyeh in 1987,116 
 
 108. See supra Part III.B. 
 109. Studio Carpenters Local Union No. 946 v. Loew’s, Inc., 182 F.2d 168, 170 
(9th Cir. 1950). 
 110. Id. at 169.  The carpenters union was the plaintiff against The 
International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and Moving Picture 
Operators of the United States (IATSE) as the defendant.  Id.  The union had 
entered into bargaining agreements with IATSE, which granted to members of the 
union an exclusive right to perform all required carpenter work.  Id.  The union 
alleged that IATSE conspired with other companies to lock out the union 
members, and that IATSE deprived union members of the privilege to work 
granted by the bargaining agreements.  Id.  See 26 C.J.S. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS § 
63 (2011) (“The rights and liabilities of the parties under a labor agreement or a 
collective bargaining agreement may be the subject of a declaratory judgment.”). 
 111. Studio Carpenters, 182 F.2d at 169. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 170. 
 114. Id. 
 115. London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981). 
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Marx v. Loral Corp. in 1996,117 and Forsyth v. Humana, Inc. in 1997.118 
2. The Eighth Circuit Forgets Williamson  
Almost one hundred years after the Eighth Circuit established 
the “deficiency” approach in Williamson,119 paving the way for five 
other circuit courts to follow, the Eighth Circuit briefly revisited the 
issue in Tolen v. Ashcroft.120 
In Tolen, the plaintiff brought numerous claims under Title 
VII121 and Bivens122 for racial discrimination and retaliation against 
various defendants.123  Upon a dismissal with leave to amend, the 
plaintiff filed an amended complaint124 alleging only the Title VII 
claims.125  In a footnote and without mentioning Williamson, the 
Eighth Circuit held that the plaintiff had “waived his Bivens claims,” 
reasoning that the plaintiff had “voluntarily dismissed his Bivens 
claim[s]” by “not includ[ing] either of these claims in his [final 
complaint].”126  By requiring repleading of legally deficient 
claims,127 the Eighth Circuit moved away from the “deficiency” 
approach, which would have allowed the legally deficient claims to 
be preserved without repleading.128  Instead, the Eighth Circuit 
 
 116. King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 117. Marx v. Loral Corp., 87 F.3d 1049, 1055–56 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 118. Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 119. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 120. Tolen v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 879, 882 n.2 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 121. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2006) (prohibiting 
discrimination by employers, including the federal government, on the basis of 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin). 
 122. See generally Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of 
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (ruling that an implied cause of action existed for 
an individual whose Fourth Amendment freedom from unreasonable search and 
seizures had been violated by federal agents). 
 123. Tolen, 377 F.3d at 881.  The plaintiff, Eric Tolen, was the Assistant United 
States Attorney.  Id.  The defendants included United States Attorney General 
John Ashcroft, FBI Special Agent Gary Fuhr, and Department of Justice attorney 
Joseph Gontram.  Id. 
 124. The plaintiff’s final complaint was actually his Second Amended 
Complaint.  Id. at 882. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 882 n.2. 
 127. The trial court had dismissed the Bivens claims because case law provided 
that the plaintiff must pursue available remedies under the Civil Service Reform 
Act of 1978 instead of pursuing monetary damages under Bivens.  Tolen v. 
Ashcroft, No. 4:01CV00992 SNL/WKU, 2002 WL 172437, at *6 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 4, 
2002). 
 128. See Williamson v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., 141 F. 54, 57 (8th 
Cir. 1905) (holding that legally deficient claims that strike a “vital blow” to the 
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cited the Ninth Circuit case129 of Forsyth v. Humana, Inc. and 
concluded: ‘“If a plaintiff fails to include dismissed claims in an 
amended complaint, the plaintiff is deemed to have waived any 
error in the ruling dismissing the prior complaint.”’130 
3. Summarizing the “Replead All” Approach 
The Ninth Circuit has consistently held to the least plaintiff-
friendly approach that all claims must be repleaded in order to 
preserve them for appellate review, regardless of whether the 
claims were legally or technically deficient.  The Eighth Circuit, 
while having established in a century-old case the “deficiency” 
approach that has been followed by five other circuit courts, 
appears to instead approve of the “replead all” approach based on 
a modern case. 
D. Federal Approaches Conclusion 
In determining whether a plaintiff is required to replead 
claims that were dismissed with leave to amend in order to preserve 
the claims for appellate review, eight of the federal circuit courts 
have articulated three different approaches: (1) the Seventh 
Circuit’s “no repleading” approach; (2) the Second, Third, Fifth, 
Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits’ “deficiency” approach; and 
(3) the Ninth, and also perhaps, the Eighth Circuits’ “replead all” 
approach. 
IV. DETERMINING THE BEST APPROACH 
This part of the article first identifies the competing priorities 
of the civil rules.  Then this part argues against the “deficiency” and 
 
plaintiff’s action are preserved even if they were not repleaded in the amended 
complaint). 
 129. The court also cited two other cases from the Seventh and Eighth Circuits 
for the proposition that “an amended complaint supersedes an original 
complaint.”  Tolen v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 879, 882 n.2 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting 
Karnes v. Poplar Bluff Transfer Co. (In re Atlas Van Lines, Inc.), 209 F.3d 1064, 
1067 (8th Cir. 2000)).  However, these cases do not deal with the dismissed claims 
preservation issue in the context of a 12(b)(6) dismissal with leave to amend.  See 
In re Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 209 F.3d at 1067 (determining subject matter 
jurisdiction); Fuhrer v. Fuhrer, 292 F.2d 140, 144 (7th Cir. 1961) (considering 
pleadings upon a summary judgment motion). 
 130. Tolen, 377 F.3d at 882 n.2 (emphasis added) (quoting Forsyth v. Humana, 
Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
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“replead all” approaches and presents the reasons why the “no 
repleading” approach best supports the policies of the civil rules. 
A. Competing Priorities of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure  
The competing priorities of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure are handily articulated in Rule 1: “[T]o secure [a] just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination.”131  “[T]his philosophical 
mandate. . . . reflects the spirit in which the rules were conceived 
and written . . . .”132  Indeed, “Rule 1 remains as the over-arching 
and most comprehensive principle of construction.”133 
A rule that meets this philosophical mandate does not ignore 
any one of the competing priorities, but instead seeks to balance all 
the competing priorities.134  To that end, the competing priorities 
should be viewed on a “plane of equality.”135  Several principles 
stand out to determine how a rule should balance competing 
priorities: (1) facilitate decisions on the merits, (2) simplify 
procedure, and (3) minimize technicalities.136 
The policy consideration for the maxim of original complaint 
supersession fits within the mandate of Rule 1.  By advocating that 
the plaintiff should give notice of all the issues that are in 
controversy so that they can be handled and comprehended 
expeditiously, the maxim of original complaint supersession seeks 
to achieve the goal of achieving justice and judicial economy.  The 
policy consideration for the maxim of issue preservation likewise 
fits within the mandate of Rule 1.  By requiring the raising of an 
issue to preserve appellate review, the maxim of issue preservation 
seeks to promote justice and economy by preventing unfair surprise 
and encouraging finality. 
 
 
 131. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 132. 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1029, at 148 (3d ed. 2002). 
 133. Id. § 1029, at 152. 
 134. See id. § 1029, at 158 (“Rule 1 does not pronounce a single canon of 
construction but rather delineates the inherent tension throughout the rules.  For 
example, ‘speed’ often saves ‘expense,’ but at the cost of ‘justice.’  On the other 
hand, dignifying a meritless claim with a lengthy trial also sacrifices justice. . . . The 
trade-offs between and among speed, expense, and justice are apparent . . . .”). 
 135. See id. § 1029, at 157–58 (“[I]t should be noted that Rule 1 places the 
objectives of ‘speedy’ and ‘inexpensive’ on a plane of equality with ‘just.’”). 
 136. See id. § 1029, at 150–51. 
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B. The “Replead All” Approach Does Not Promote Just, Speedy, and 
Inexpensive Determinations 
The “replead all” approach requires repleading to preserve 
appellate review for all claims dismissed with leave to amend.  This 
hard line approach results in determinations that are neither just, 
speedy, nor inexpensive. 
First, the “replead all” approach is the least just—and most 
prejudicial—of all the approaches because it restricts the most 
claims available for an appellate review on the merits.137  Justice is 
also not served because this approach “sets a trap” for unsuspecting 
plaintiffs that may be reluctant to replead for fear of sanctions.138  
Second, requiring repleading is generally not speedy or 
inexpensive.  This is especially true for legally deficient claims 
because repleading would result in nothing but a second 
dismissal.139  Although the process of repleading may not consume 
too much time and too many resources, the zero return on that 
investment produces an inefficient result. 
Finally, while plenty of authorities have been critical of the 
 
 137. See Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 373 (1966) (“These 
rules were designed in large part to get away from some of the old procedural 
booby traps which common-law pleaders could set to prevent unsophisticated 
litigants from ever having their day in court.  If rules of procedure work as they 
should in an honest and fair judicial system, they not only permit, but should as 
nearly as possible guarantee that bona fide complaints be carried to an 
adjudication on the merits.”); De Franco v. United States, 18 F.R.D. 156, 159 (S.D. 
CA. 1955) (“The general purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to see 
that actions are tried on the merits, and to dispense with technical procedural 
problems.  To fall back on a technicality and refuse to permit a case to come to 
issue on the merits is to sap the very heart out of the rules and to obviate the very 
purpose for which they are intended.”); 6 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1, § 1476 
(“[W]aiver should not be imposed without considering the possible prejudicial 
impact on the amending party.”). 
 138. See USS-POSCO Indus. v. Contra Costa Cnty. Bldg. & Constr. Trades 
Council, 31 F.3d 800, 811–12 (9th Cir. 1994) (reviewing the district court’s award 
of Rule 11 sanctions against appellant for its “persistent reincorporation of 
stricken parts of the complaint in the amended complaints”); Davis v. TXO Prod. 
Corp., 929 F.2d 1515, 1518 n.2 (10th Cir. 1991) (“A party unfamiliar with this rule 
may be reticent to raise a claim in an amended complaint that had been previously 
dismissed for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted.  The party 
may, perhaps realistically, fear imposition of Rule 11 sanction.”). 
 139. See Bastian v. Petren Res. Corp., 892 F.2d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 1990) (“It is 
not waiver—it is prudence and economy—for parties not to reassert a position that 
the trial judge has rejected. Had the plaintiffs repleaded their Rule 10b-5 charge 
without alleging loss causation, the judge would have dismissed the charge, not 
only with prejudice but with annoyance.”). 
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Ninth Circuit’s “replead all” approach,140 it is worth noting that the 
Ninth Circuit itself has been apprehensive in upholding a minority 
view that has never been analyzed much by the court,141 and the 
principle of stare decisis142 stands as the lone barrier to an 
overruling.143 
C. The “Deficiency” Approach Promotes Justice But Does Not Promote 
Speedy and Inexpensive Determinations 
In contrast to the “replead all” blanket approach, the 
“deficiency” approach does appropriately serve justice by allowing 
dismissed claims to be adjudicated on the merits when the claims 
are dismissed for legal deficiencies.  However, this approach does 
not best serve the administration of speedy and inexpensive 
determinations. 
First, the potential exists that much time and a lot of monetary 
resources will be spent on resolving the uncertainty of whether a 
claim is technically or legally deficient.  This uncertainty can be 
illustrated by the fact pattern in Bastian.144 
In Bastian, the plaintiffs’ 10b-5 claim was dismissed for failure 
 
 140. See United States ex. rel. Atkinson v. PA. Shipbuilding Co., 473 F.3d 506, 
516 n.16 (3d Cir. 2007) (describing the Ninth Circuit approach as “formalistic”); 
Davis, 929 F.2d at 1517 (also describing the Ninth Circuit approach as 
“formalistic”); Wilson v. First Hous. Inv. Corp., 566 F.2d 1235, 1237–38 (5th Cir. 
1978) (“A rule that a party waives his objections to the court’s dismissal he elects to 
amend is too mechanical and seems to be a rigid application of the concept that a 
Rule 15(a) amendment completely replaces the pleading it amends.” (quoting 6 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: 
CIVIL § 1476, at 393 (1971)), vacated on other grounds, 444 U.S. 959 (1979); In re 
Crysen/Montenay Energy Co., 240 B.R. 166, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (describing the 
Ninth Circuit approach as an “aberrational rule”); United States v. Bonanno 
Organized Crime Family of La Cosa Nostra, 695 F. Supp. 1426, 1433 (E.D.N.Y. 
1988) (describing the Ninth Circuit approach as “questionable”). 
 141. See Marx v. Loral Corp., 87 F.3d 1049, 1055–56 (9th Cir. 1996) (enforcing 
the Circuit approach but acknowledging the criticism that the approach is unduly 
formalistic, rigid, and mechanical); London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 
814 (9th Cir. 1981) (“We are well aware that other circuits do not look with favor 
upon this rule . . . .”).   
 142. See 21 C.J.S. Courts § 194 (2011) (“The theory is that when a legal 
principle is accepted and established, rights may accrue under it, security and 
certainty require that the principle be subsequently recognized and followed, and 
having relied on precedent to define rights, those rights should not be affected by 
judicial fiat.” (footnote omitted)). 
 143. See London, 644 F.2d at 814 (9th Cir. 1981) (enforcing the approach 
because “[i]t has long been the rule in this circuit” and the court is “not at liberty 
to re-examine its validity”). 
 144. Bastian, 892 F.2d at 682–83. 
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to sufficiently allege loss causation.145  But one of the reasons why 
the plaintiffs did not allege loss causation is because they did not 
believe that this element was necessary.146  Thus, even though the 
court characterized the dismissal as a technical pleading deficiency, 
the crux of the issue was in effect a disagreement regarding the 
necessity of a legal element of a claim.  Indeed, this situation 
presents the difficulty of applying the “deficiency” approach: was 
the claim dismissed based on a technical deficiency that requires 
repleading in order to preserve appellate review, or was it actually 
dismissed based on a legal deficiency that would trigger 
preservation without repleading? 
This difficult distinction was made even more unclear by the 
Third Circuit in Atkinson.  In Atkinson, the Third Circuit explained 
the “deficiency” approach in terms of the “futility” of repleading.147  
The court articulated that repleading is not required when 
repleading is futile, and “repleading is futile when the dismissal is 
‘on the merits[,]’” which means that the dismissal was “with 
prejudice or based on some legal barrier other than want of 
specificity or particularity.”148  However, this guidance is puzzling.  
If a court had dismissed a claim with prejudice, the issue of whether 
to replead would not have been an issue at all, because this whole 
issue was premised on a court’s dismissal with leave to amend, and 
a court would never dismiss a claim both with leave to amend and 
with prejudice.149  Thus, the Third Circuit’s instruction to analyze 
whether the dismissal was with prejudice in order to resolve the 
repleading issue is ineffective.   
The second reason why the “deficiency” approach does not 
best serve the administration of speedy and inexpensive 
determinations is because litigants may end up expending 
resources on a level similar to that under the “replead all” 
approach.  A litigant facing this waiver issue, having difficulty 
deciding whether a claim is legally or technically deficient and 
fearing that a wrong decision would lead to waiver, may decide to 
play it safe and replead regardless of whether he or she believes the 
 
 145. See id. at 682. 
 146. See id. 
 147. United States ex. rel. Atkinson, 473 F.3d 506, 516, 517 n.17 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 148. Id. at 516. 
 149. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 537 (9th ed. 2009) (defining a claim to be 
“dismissed with prejudice” when it is “removed from the court’s docket in such a 
way that the plaintiff is foreclosed from filing a suit again on the same claim or 
claims”). 
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claims would be preserved under the “deficiency” approach.  
Although this strategy maximizes the chance of justice on the 
merits, it undoubtedly costs some time and money—for both the 
parties and the court—to go through the repleading process. 
In sum, although the “deficiency” approach promotes justice 
by allowing for some claims to be preserved without repleading, 
this approach is not the most speedy or inexpensive because it 
require resources to be spent deciphering trial court orders that 
are not always clear in conveying why claims are dismissed.150  
Indeed, the “deficiency” approach fails to meet the rule-making 
principle of simplifying procedures. 
D. The “No Repleading” Approach Promotes Just, Speedy, and 
Inexpensive Determinations 
Unlike all the other approaches, the “no repleading” approach 
is best because it appropriately balances the civil procedure 
priorities of securing just, speedy, and inexpensive determinations. 
First, the “no repleading” approach preserves all dismissed 
claims, regardless of the type of pleading deficiency or the level of 
futility in repleading.  Accordingly, the most claims are reached on 
the merits under this approach, thus producing the most just 
determinations.   
In Atkinson, the Third Circuit conveyed a concern with 
allowing preservation of a claim that was technically deficient: when 
claims are dismissed against a whole defendant, it would be unjust 
to drag the defendant back into the lawsuit years later on appeal 
without notice that the defendant might potentially be on the 
hook.151  This reasoning is unpersuasive.  Appellate review is a pillar 
of the American judicial system,152 and all litigants must be held to 
a standard of at least knowing that all trial court decisions are 
subject to at least one appellate review.153  Moreover, even if the 
 
 150. See Elfenbein v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 590 F.2d 445, 447–50 (2d Cir. 
1978) (finding it “impossible to determine [with] any real degree of certainty what 
the district court intended” and strongly encouraging trial courts to only use “the 
terms ‘with prejudice’ or ‘without prejudice’ only when making a determination as 
to the Res [sic] judicata effect of a dismissal”). 
 151. Atkinson, 473 F.3d at 518. 
 152. See Walters, supra note 2, at 909–10 (“For civil cases, the right to appeal a 
trial court decision developed at English common law and came with the colonists 
to America.”). 
 153. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2009) (“Competent 
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation 
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dismissed defendant is summoned back to the litigation, the party 
would be granted adequate time to prepare a defense.  Instead, the 
injustice is in allowing a whole defendant to escape liability without 
ever reaching the merits of the dismissed claims. 
Second, the “no repleading” approach is best because it is the 
most speedy and inexpensive approach by way of spending no 
resources on determining whether claims pass the “deficiency” 
approach test. 
Finally, the “no repleading” approach is consistent with the 
automatic nature of the other rules of preserving appellate review 
on pretrial rulings: preservation is automatic when the court denies 
the defendant’s motion to dismiss,154 preservation is automatic 
when the court denies the plaintiff’s motion to strike a defense,155 
and preservation is automatic when the court denies either party’s 
motion for partial summary judgment.156  These rules, like the “no 
repleading” approach, are clear and simple. 
In short, the “no repleading” approach satisfies the policy of 
the maxim of issue preservation—issues raised and argued are 
preserved.  And because litigants are always on notice of the 
potential for appellate review, the policy of the maxim of original 
complaint supersession is not a concern. 
E. Conclusion—Determining the Best Approach 
The “replead all” and “deficiency” approaches insufficiently 
balance the competing priorities of justice, speediness, and 
inexpensiveness.  The “replead all” approach does not reach 
enough claims for adjudication on the merits, and the “deficiency” 
approach requires too many resources for achieving, interpreting, 
and applying the standards for preservation. 
In contrast, the “replead all” approach appropriately balances 
the competing priorities by meeting the civil rules’ core principles.  
The principle of facilitating decisions on the merits is achieved by 
preserving the most decisions for adjudication on the merits.  The 
principle of simplifying procedures is achieved by allowing 
preservation automatically.  And the principle of minimizing 
technicalities is achieved by removing the waiver trap for 
 
reasonably necessary for the representation.”). 
 154. See Wilson v. First Hous. Inv. Corp., 566 F.2d 1235, 1238 (5th Cir. 1978), 
vacated on other grounds, 444 U.S. 959 (1979). 
 155. See id. 
 156. See Bastian v. Petren Res. Corp., 892 F.2d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 1990). 
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unsuspecting plaintiffs.  In sum, the “replead all” approach is the 
best approach for securing just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determinations. 
V. PRESERVING CLAIMS IN THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
In the Eighth Circuit, the issue of whether a plaintiff is 
required to replead claims dismissed with leave to amend in order 
to preserve them for appellate review may be puzzling due to 
conflicting case law.  Although a panel of this circuit court created 
the “deficiency” approach in Williamson,157 another panel applied 
the “replead all” approach a century later in Tolen.158  Which 
approach is the precedent in the Eighth Circuit?  And more 
importantly, how can plaintiffs in the Eighth Circuit preserve 
dismissed claims in light of conflicting case law? 
A. Eighth Circuit Precedent—Williamson’s “Deficiency” Approach or 
Tolen’s “Replead All” Approach? 
Historically, the Eighth Circuit has had a “peculiar approach” 
to resolving conflicting prior panel opinions.159  The general rule 
was that one panel was “not at liberty to disregard a precedent 
handed down by another panel.”160  However, if a second panel 
violated this general rule, then subsequent panels were “free to 
choose which line of cases to follow."161  With this freedom, some 
panels resolved intra-circuit splits by upholding the “better 
approach” based on the panels’ own analysis of the issues as well as 
those of other circuit courts.162  Meanwhile, other panels employed 
the “better practice [of] follow[ing] the earliest opinion, as it 
should have controlled the subsequent panels that created the 
conflict.”163  And recently in Mader v. United States, the Eighth 
Circuit “definitively rule[d]” en banc that “the earliest opinion 
must be followed” while noting the “almost universal” acceptance 
 
 157. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 158. See supra Part III.C.2. 
 159. Williams v. Nat’l Football League, 598 F.3d 932, 934 (8th Cir. 2009) 
(Colloton, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
 160. Drake v. Scott, 812 F.2d 395, 400 (8th Cir. 1987). 
 161. Kostelec v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 64 F.3d 1220, 1228 n.8 (8th Cir. 
1995). 
 162. E.g., United States v. LeBrun, 363 F.3d 715, 719 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 163. E.g., T.L. ex rel. Ingram v. United States, 443 F.3d 956, 960 (8th Cir. 2006). 
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of this practice by other federal circuit courts.164 
In light of Mader, Williamson’s “deficiency” approach is likely 
the prevailing precedent over Tolen’s “replead all” approach for a 
simple reason: Williamson is earlier.165  However, one hesitates to 
definitively label Williamson as the law of the land in the Eighth 
Circuit.  Because although Williamson’s earlier panel opinion must 
be followed by subsequent panels, “the en banc court is not bound 
by [the earlier opinion’s] interpretation.”166  And the fact that 
Williamson was decided over a century ago may contribute to the 
court’s future preference for Tolen.167  But the precedential value of 
a case is not necessarily eroded over time,168 and the Mader decision 
does not suggest that the “earliest opinion” rule is contingent on a 
short lapse of time between conflicting panel opinions.169  Thus, 
the rule articulated in Williamson appears to be safe for now. 
B. Tips for Preserving Claims in the Eighth Circuit 
Given that Williamson’s “deficiency” approach is likely the 
controlling precedent in the Eighth Circuit, and that the 
“deficiency” approach requires the potentially confusing process of 
categorizing claims as legally or technically deficient, a plaintiff in 
the Eighth Circuit can employ two methods to ensure the 
preservation of claims dismissed with leave to amend. 
First, a plaintiff can replead the dismissed claims.  This method 
ensures a second dismissal with prejudice that would preserve the 
claims for appellate review.170  The downside to this strategy is the 
risk of sanctions for not following the court’s order to amend.171  
 
 164. Mader v. United States, 654 F.3d 794, 800 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
 165. See id.  Compare Williamson v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., 141 
F. 54 (8th Cir. 1905), with Tolen v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 879 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 166. See Mader, 654 F.3d at 800. 
 167. See 21 C.J.S. Courts § 199 (2011) (“[L]apse of time has been said to be a 
significant factor in determining the weight of a decision.”). 
 168. Id. (“A deliberate decision does not lose its authority as a precedent solely 
by lapse of time, and it is not necessary for a court to reiterate the doctrine to keep 
it in force.”). 
 169. See Mader, 654 F.3d at 800. 
 170. See Bastian v. Petren Res. Corp., 892 F.2d 680, 682–83 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(“There was no appealable order until [the district judge] dismissed the amended 
complaint with prejudice. When a final decision is appealed, the appeal brings up 
all previous rulings of the district judge adverse to the appellant.”). 
 171. See USS-POSCO Indus. v. Contra Costa Cnty. Bldg. & Constr. Trades 
Council, 31 F.3d 800, 811–12 (9th Cir. 1994) (reviewing the district court’s award 
of Rule 11 sanctions against appellant for its “persistent reincorporation of 
stricken parts of the complaint in the amended complaints”). 
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However, this risk is negligible in the Eighth Circuit because 
conflicting case law exists on the issue, thus the plaintiff would have 
a reasonable basis to replead for fear that an en banc court will 
follow Tolen instead of Williamson.172  Indeed, “Counsel [is] not 
required to risk forfeiting their client’s right to appeal in order to 
avoid sanctions.”173 
Second, a plaintiff can “stand on” the dismissed claims as 
suggested by the Third Circuit in Atkinson.174  To do this, a plaintiff 
can either add a “Preserved Claims” section to the amended 
complaint or “file a notice with the district court” to convey the 
plaintiff’s intent to stand on the original pleading.175  These two 
tactics are not the only ways to stand on the dismissed claims.176  
Whatever the plaintiff decides to do to stand on the original 
complaint, the key requirement appears to be that the plaintiff 
should engage in some minimal communication or affirmative 
action so that the plaintiff’s intent is clearly received by the court. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Are claims dismissed with leave to amend waived if not raised 
again?  The short answer: it depends on the court.  Eight federal 
courts of appeals have articulated three different approaches to 
determine whether repleading is required for preservation.  The 
best approach allows all claims to be preserved without repleading, 
thus securing just, speedy, and inexpensive determinations.  And 
although conflicting case law exists within the Eighth Circuit, the 
“deficiency” approach is likely the precedent in light of a recent en 
banc decision that requires subsequent panels to follow the earliest 
opinion in the circuit.  Lastly, litigants in the Eighth Circuit should 
be proactive in communicating with the court in order to preserve 
dismissed claims for appellate review. 
 
 
 172. See Smith v. Nat’l Health Care Serv. of Peoria, 934 F.2d 95, 99 (7th Cir. 
1991) (“[T]he sanctions cannot stand [if] plaintiff’s repleading . . . was not 
without some support in the law at that time . . . .”).  
 173. USS-POSCO Indus., 31 F.3d at 812. 
 174. See United States ex rel. Atkinson v. PA. Shipbuilding Co., 473 F.3d 506, 
517 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 175. See id. 
 176. See id.  (“We do not adopt a rigid requirement as to what a plaintiff must 
do to stand on a dismissed complaint.”). 
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